No matter what time or location you are, you can call our interactive contact center and stay close to your bank 24/7. Id. (Second Amendment in original) (cited Lea Co. v. N.C. Vol. of Transp., 323 N.C. 697, 699, 374 pp. E.2d 866, 868 (1989) (emphasis omitted) (cited in Collins v.

Simms, 257 N.C. 1, 8, 125 p.E.2d 298, 303 (1962)). For this reason, the Commercial Court concluded that “the Ministry was not empowered to draw findings of fact or legal conclusions on the issue of deductibility in its second amended final decision of the Agency”, so that “the findings and conclusions of the Agency`s second amended final decision on the issue of deductibility are null and void and have no legal effect. ” to exclude the possibility that the Ministry`s decision on the issue of deductibility, as set out in the Agency`s second final decision as amended, would be “subject to due judicial review.” Id. to *5. Consequently, the Commercial Court granted the Ministry`s request for rejection. Id. to *5, 6. On November 11, 2008, Fidelity Bank filed a request for a hearing in which it challenged the Department`s decision on the deductibility of market discount income that Fidelity Bank had obtained from discounted bonds and requested an exemption from the Department`s claim for interest on the additional amount of income tax, which had been valued against Fidelity Bank.

The 30. In June 2009, the Administrative Judge issued a partial summary judgment in favour of the Department on the basis that the market discount income on the discounted bonds was not deductible for corporate income tax purposes in North Carolina.1 On November 16, 2009, the Administrative Judge issued a partial summary judgment in favour of Fidelity Bank in respect of the Ministry`s attempt. From: Charge interest on the amount of unpaid taxes that the department claimed Fidelity Bank owed. On November 25, 2009, the decision of the administrative judge was submitted to the Ministry for a final decision.2 On November 22, 2009, the decision of the administrative judge was submitted to the Ministry. In January 2010, the Ministère issued a final decision of the AMF, in which it rendered the administrative judge`s decision on the issue of deductibility and referred the matter back to the administrative judge for new findings of fact regarding the issue of the interest rate reduction.3 On December 10, 2013, the Ministry issued an amended final decision of the Agency in which it considered the decision of the administrative judge regarding the deduction decision as and referred Fidelity Bank`s request for reduction of interest assessment to the administrative judge for further proceedings. On April 23, 2015, the Administrative Tribunal issued an amended decision finding that Fidelity Bank should be required to pay interest on the amount of unpaid tax in 2001. 24. In July 2015, the Department issued a second final decision amended by the Agency, finding that Fidelity Bank was not entitled to deduct market repayment income for purposes of its 2001 corporate income tax return and requiring Fidelity Bank to pay additional taxes and related interest, as the Department had rejected Fidelity Bank`s claim that market rebate revenues, that it had made in the 2001 tax year, were deductible for North Carolina businesses. Income tax purposes. The main issue before this court in these consolidated appeals is whether the North Carolina Commercial Court correctly interpreted section 105-130.5(b)(1) of the N.C.G.S. to prevent Fidelity Bank from deducting “market discount income” in respect of discounted U.S.

corporate tax obligations in North Carolina. Considering that the relevant parts of N.C.G.S. Section 105-130.5(b)(1) clearly and unequivocally excludes the proposed deduction, we uphold the Commercial Court`s substantive decision on this issue, while reversing the Commercial Court`s decision to dismiss the second of Fidelity Bank`s two applications for judicial review in these cases and to remit this matter to the Commercial Court for further pre-trial detention at North Carolina Department of Revenue, directing to rescind this part of the Department`s second amended final decision on the issue of deductibility for lack of material competence. A clear word has a “defined and known meaning in the law.” C.T.H. Corp. v. Maxwell, 212 N.C. 803, 810, 195 P.E. 36, 40 (1938); see also State Highway Comm`n v.

Hemphill, 269 N.C. 535, 539, 153 pp. E.2d 22, 26 (1967) (stating that the wording of a statute is unambiguous if it expresses “a unique, defined and reasonable meaning”) (cited ex rel. Long v. Smitherman, 251 N.C. 682, 684, 111 p.E.2d 834, 836 (1960))). In the event that the General Assembly uses a clear word without giving an explicit legal definition, that word will receive its clear meaning. See Walker, 348 N.C., p.66, 499 p.E.2d, p.E.2d, p.431 (noting that, although “the word `terminate` is not defined in Chapter 128 of the North Carolina General Statutes”, “this word is unambiguous”. see also Poole v.