More recent versions, such as those of Raz (1984a, 1984b), take a completely different path. To say that X is the holder of rights, according to them, is to say that his interests or any of their interests are sufficient grounds to impose obligations on others, either not to interfere with X in the performance of an act, or to secure him in something. This avoids, in particular, the problem of the rights of third parties, because the explanation is simply that it is only a question of whether the system recognizes the interests of Z as part of the reason for the obligations of X and Y or whether it is only the interests of X and Y. Raz (1997) pointed out that this does not mean that only the interests of the right holder are relevant to determining whether something should be recognized. as a right. General considerations or considerations of common interest may also be relevant. Rights are equally divided into legal and just. The first are those where the party has legal title to a thing, and in that case, their remedy is for a violation of that thing by bringing an action in court. Although the holder of the title may not have a real interest, but only hold it as trustee, the action must be brought in his name and not in that of the trust in general. The latter or equitable rights are those which can be enforced in an equitable court by the trust. Instead, most authors argued that rights should be analyzed in other, more fundamental terms, primarily duty, permission, and power, perhaps with the addition of other criteria. This means that not all rights will be of great importance. Their importance depends on the strength of the reasons of duty, permission, or power.

Before examining these reports more closely, it is worth mentioning another point. Theorists are divided between those who believe that rights are, so to speak, the “reflex” of duty, permission, or power, and those who believe that the law takes precedence over them. The question is whether duty, etc. establishes the right or whether the law establishes duty. Most older authors (e.g. Bentham, Austin, Hohfeld, Kelsen) seem to have adhered to the first view, while more recent authors (e.g. MacCormick, Raz, Wellman) adopt the second view. The second view implies that the force of a right is not necessarily exhausted by an existing set of duties, etc., that flow from it, but may be a reason for the creation of new obligations as circumstances change.

The latter view, at least, seems to be more consistent with the operation of constitutional legal claims. Other approaches can be classified in different ways, but there is a significant gap between those who believe that rights are designated as practical reasons by their great weight and those who believe that rights are nothing special in this regard, but rather must be analyzed in duties, permits, powers, etc. or a combination of these. perhaps with the addition of other conditions. Any legal right that one person possesses refers to a corresponding legal obligation imposed on another. For example, if a person owns a house and property, he or she has the right to own and enjoy it without interference from others, who have a corresponding duty not to interfere with the owner`s rights by entering the property or breaking into the house. Although Mills does not necessarily share the view that all rights are linked to the foundations of well-being, many contemporary authors (e.g., Raz 1984a, 1984b; Wellman 1985, 1995) agree that the basic concept of a law is something common to law and morality, although some have argued that legal authors, particularly Hohfeld, provide a better and clearer starting point for general analysis than previous authors in moral philosophy. The view that the basic concept is common to both seems consistent with the assertion that legal claims concerning justification in practical reasoning should nevertheless be based on moral claims. The powers also illustrate a general problem in the analysis of legal claims and arguably rights in general. Namely, whether an element is to be regarded as forming part of the essence of the concept of right or whether it is merely an element of what its content is (conditionally), that is to say, what a right exists or is to be obtained. The answer will often revolve around whether to adopt a theory of interest or a right-wing electoral theory. MacCormick (1976), for example, argued that any theory of rights that could not take into account children`s rights must be erroneous, which, in his view, was a reason for adopting an interest rate theory.

Wellman (1995), for his part, argues that the assertion that very young children or people with serious mental illness may have legal rights distorts the concept of law because they lack proper control of the legal system. Instead, these rights should only be exercised by those who can bring such actions on their behalf. For example, in his view, a very young child would not have the right not to be harmed by neglect by someone else`s behaviour. On the contrary, the child`s parents would have the right not to have their child injured through negligence. One of the difficulties with this position seems to be that it cannot be easily reconciled with the relevant remedies (e.g. for damages) that the law would recognize. In this example, the law would clearly compensate for the loss of the child if he or she has been injured, and not for the loss of the parent if his or her child is injured (although the child may be a separate cause of action in some systems). Many of the related issues are not limited to rights, but are shared with duties and powers, so only a brief overview is given. Not all philosophers agree that rights can be fully analyzed. White (1984), for example, argued that the task was impossible because the concept of one right was as fundamental as any other, such as duty, liberty, power, etc. (or any set of these) in which it is usually analyzed. However, he agreed that the rights could be explained in part by referring to those concepts.

White`s approach, largely based on precise linguistic analysis, remained a minority approach.